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CHILD SEX ABUSE EVIDENCE PROBLEMS
Robert P. Ringland*
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no other type of case is more disturbing to prosecute, defend, or preside over than a child sex abuse case. Cases involving children as victims make it easy to become involved and hard to remain
professionally objective. This is all the more reason to have guidelines
established for the common trial objections which usually occur during
these types of trials. While these objections may occur in other types of
cases, they are more frequent in and particular to child sex abuse cases.
This article will outline and discuss several of these common trial objections and will illuminate the Ohio courts' attempt to deal with them.
II.

THE INDICTMENT

A critical issue in the prosecution of child sex abuse defendants is
the sufficiency of the indictment. The indictment on child sex abuse
cases usually involves actions which have occurred over a period of
time, for example, between March 1, 1984 and June 1, 1984. Many
young children in recounting the events to the authorities are unable to
pinpoint the exact time that the alleged events occurred. Time to young
children has very little meaning. At best, they may remember episodes
of their lives or "event times" and then, relate them to the incident-"around the time the Easter bunny brought candy," or "right
before school was out for the summer."' Further, many prosecutors
state the victims' names by way of initials rather than using their
names in full, inasmuch as the indictments are public records. Their
purpose is ostensibly to protect the victim from unwarranted publicity.
As a result, motions for bill of particulars may be filed by the defense
attorney for specific times and victims' names. In many cases, because
of the children's inability to specify the exact time of the occurrences,
the prosecutor is unable to give more detailed information on the bill of
particulars. This omission is likely to result in objections being made
either at pretrial or at trial as to the insufficiency of the bill of
* Administrative Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Clermont County, Ohio. B.A., Ohio State
University (1967); J.D., University of Cincinnati School of Law (1970). Former Defense Attorney
and Assistant Prosecuting Attorney; Member of the Ohio Bar.
I. See S. SGROI. HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL INTERVENTION IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 323
(1982); D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPIRO & L. STELLWAGEN, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD (1985)
[hereinafter WHITCOMB].
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particulars.'
Ohio Criminal Rules of Procedure, Rule 7(B) states:
The indictment or information .

.

. shall contain a statement that the

accused has committed some public offense therein specified. Such statement[s] may be made in ordinary and concise language without any
technical averments or any allegations not essential to be proved. It may
be in the words of the applicable section of the statute as long as the
words of that statute charge an offense, or in any words sufficient to give
the accused notice of all the elements of the offense with which he is
charged. 3
Ohio Criminal Rules of Procedure, Rule 7(E) provides:
When the defendant makes a written request within twenty-one days after arraignment but not later than seven days before trial

. . .

the prose-

cuting attorney shall furnish the defendant with a bill of particulars setand of the conduct
ting up specifically the nature of the offense charged
4
of the defendant alleged to constitute the offense.
Arguably, under Rule 16(B)(1)(e) of the Ohio Criminal Rules of
Procedure, the defendant is entitled to the full name of the victim.
However, if the prosecutor certifies to the court that disclosure "may
subject the witness or others to physical or substantial . . . harm," 5

such disclosure may be prevented. Although a hearing may be held to
determine the reason for the certification," the subsequent certification
is binding on the court.7 One Ohio court has held that the name of the
child victim in a charge of complicity to rape is not required under
Ohio Criminal Rules of Procedure, Rule 7.' Where the bill of particulars is unable to give the specific time of the incident, the defense usually raises objections based upon a violation of due process rights of the
defendant, in that the defendant is required to stand trial on the basis
of an indictment and bill which state an offense allegedly occurring
over a long period of time.
In a well-reasoned opinion, Ohio's First District Court of Appeals
discussed this problem. In State v. Gingell,9 the court stated:
2. See State v. Madden, 15 Ohio App. 3d 130, 472 N.E.2d 1126 (1984); State v. Gingell, 7
Ohio App. 3d 364, 455 N.E.2d 1066 (1982).
3. OHIo R. CRIM. P. 7(B).
4. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 7(E).
5. See State v. Howard, 56 Ohio St. 2d 328, 331-332, 383 N.E.2d 912, 915 (1978). There
is no federal counterpart to Ohio Criminal Rule of Procedure, Rule 16(B)(l)(e).
6. See State v. Owens, 51 Ohio App. 2d 132, 147, 366 N.E.2d 1367, 1376 (1975). See also
infra note 7 and accompanying text.
7. See I K. APLIN, D. DOWD, B. GILDAY JR. & B. METZ, ANDERSON'S OHIO CRIMINAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 18.6 (1984).
8. See State v. Hopkins, No. C-840852 (Ohio Ct. App., ist Dist. Dec. 24, 1985).
9. 7 Ohio App. 3d 364, 455 N.E.2d 1066 (1982).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/3
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[W]hile it may (under circumstances hereinafter discussed) become
mandatory for the state at some appropriate point to give specific times
or dates where it is necessary in order to permit an accused to prepare an
adequate defense or to put the accused on notice of which particular act
is alleged to constitute the charged offense, failure to provide dates and
times in an indictment does not, of itself, provide a basis for dismissal of
the charges.' 0
The court proceeded to explain examples where time is critical; for example, where an alibi defense is presented or where the age of the victim at the time of the alleged offense is an element. Furthermore, the
court held that a bill of particulars is required to specify only the particular conduct and not when that conduct is alleged to have occurred." The Gingell court found that neither the indictment nor the
bill of particulars were designed to provide the accused with specifications of evidence or to serve as a substitute for a proper demand for
discovery. 1 2 Therefore, the court found that on the facts of the case,
Criminal Rule 7(B) and (E) had not been violated.1 3 The Gingell court
also indicated that perhaps the proper procedure would be for defendant to file a motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the case.", The court
further indicated, after reviewing the record, that there was no showing
that the time intervals set out in the indictment prejudiced defendant's
ability to defend himself; that is, the date and time of the alleged criminal conduct were not critical.' 3
A majority of the Ohio courts of appeals likewise have held that
time and dates do not have to be specific in indictments on charges of
sexual abuse.' The courts in State v. Madden,17 State v. Humfleet, 8
and State v. Barnes" addressed the question surrounding time frames
set forth in a bill of particulars, but failed to discuss dismissal concerning Criminal Rule 29 for the omission of a specific time. These courts
limited the issue to whether or not the state has or had the information

10. Id. at 367, 455 N.E.2d at 1070.
II. Id. at 368, 455 N.E.2d at 1071.
12. Id. at 367, 455 N.E.2d at 1071. See also State v. Chaffin, 30 Ohio St. 2d 13, 15-16,
282 N.E.2d 46, 48 (1972); State v. Wilson, 29 Ohio St. 2d 203, 206-07, 280 N.E.2d 915, 918
(1972); State v. Clay, 29 Ohio App. 2d 206, 213, 280 N.E.2d 385, 391 (1972).
13. Gingell, 7 Ohio App. 3d at 366, 455 N.E.2d at 1069.
14. Id. at 368, 455 N.E.2d at 1071.
15. Id. at 366-369, 455 N.E.2d at 1069-72.
16. See, e.g., State v. Gorman, No. C-840707 (Ohio Ct. App., Ist Dist. Oct. 23, 1985);
State v. Humfleet, No. CA84-04-031 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Sept. 9, 1985); State v. Hitabidel, No. 11971 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. May 1, 1985); State v. Barnes, No. CA84-05-041
(Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Apr. 8, 1985); Madden, 15 Ohio App. 3d at 130, 472 N.E.2d at 1126.
17. 15 Ohio App. 3d 130, 472 N.E.2d 1126 (1984).
18. No. CA84-04-031 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Sept. 9, 1985).
Published by
1986(Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Apr. 8, 1985).
19. eCommons,
No. CA84-05-041
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20
to permit it to establish a narrower time frame. These courts determined that if the state has or had this information, then nondisclosure
would likely constitute the prejudicial error. Unfortunately neither the
Madden, Barnes, or Humfleet courts discussed their reasoning on this
point. The Humfleet court, however, resolved the defendant's argument
that he required the specific times to establish an alibi defense, by finding that the defendant had failed to give the required alibi notification,
so that no prejudice had resulted.2 1
22
Finally, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Sellards also recently addressed the problem. Noting the examples set forth in Gingell,
the Sellards court opined that failure to provide precise dates and
times would be fatal to the prosecution where it "truly prejudices the
accused's ability to fairly defend himself."23 However, the Sellards
court found, as did the Humfleet court, that the notice of intent to rely
upon the alibi was never timely filed as required by Criminal Rule
12.1.24
One Ohio court of appeals has determined that the failure to specify and prove that the alleged events occurred after amendment of the
sentencing bill is critical.2 5 Further, another court of appeals has ruled
that where the state moves, at the close of the defendant's case in chief,
to amend an indictment to specify particular dates, where the indictment alleges events spanning an entire week, and where defendant fails
to request either a continuance or a reopening of26 his case, the granting
of a motion to amend does not constitute error.
It appears that at the time of this writing no cases have been decided where the factual situations have shown that the accused was
actually prejudiced in his ability to defend himself by an alibi defense
or where the age of the victim was a crucial element. Should such a
factual scenario occur, more than likely the remedy will not be the dismissal of the indictment at pretrial, but rather it will be a Criminal
Rule 29 acquittal at the conclusion of the case.

20. See Humfleet, No. CA84-04-031, slip op. at 1; Barnes, No. CA84-05-041, slip op. at 1;
Madden, 15 Ohio App. 3d at 132-33, 472 N.E.2d at 1129-1130.
21. Humpfleet, No. CA84-04-031, slip op. at 13-16.
22. 17 Ohio St. 3d 169, 478 N.E.2d 781 (1985).
23. Id. at 172, 478 N.E.2d at 784.
24. Id. at 172, 478 N.E.2d at 785. See also State v. Wright, No. 85AP-79, slip op. at 3
(Ohio Ct. App., 10th Dist. June 20, 1985) ("Precise dates and times are not essential elements of
the offense.").
25. See State v. Allen, No. C-840479, slip op. at 11 (Ohio Ct. App., 1st Dist. May 8, 1985)
(indictment alleging offenses occurred in summer of 1983 was plain error). Cf. State v. Butterfield, No. C-840353, slip op. at 12 (Ohio Ct. App., IstDist. Mar. 13, 1985) (indictment alleging
offenses "occurred on an undetermined date in July 1983" held satisfactory).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/3
26. State v. Skaggs, No. 84AP-463 (Ohio Ct. App., 10th Dist. July 11, 1985).
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CLOSURE OF THE COURTROOM

Another problem in child sex abuse cases arises where the victim
is extremely young and where the case has created a local sensation. In
such cases, the courtroom is often packed with reporters and spectators.
The prosecution in preparing for the trial may have had the youthful
witness visit the courtroom on several occasions and may have even
staged a mock trial to prepare the child. Certainly a crowded courtroom with strangers present while the witness/victim relays a painful,
frightening, and embarrassing recitation of the facts is troublesome
enough for an adult, needless to say a young child.17 Thus, the prosecutors often ask for closure of the courtroom.
The 1984 Ohio court of appeals decision, State v. Workman,2 8
provides a good discussion of the recent holdings involving the closure
rule and criteria to consider in closure of the courtroom. In Workman,
the Court of Appeals adopted the standard for closure set forth by the
United States Supreme Court. 9 The Workman court held that the decision of closure of the courtroom is discretionary with the trial court,
as long as the court considers, on a case-by-case basis, the criteria discussed in the Supreme Court decision.30 The criteria can include the
following: the minor victim's age, the psychological maturity and understanding of the youthful victim, the desires of the victim, the nature
of the crime (and presumably the nature of the facts which constitute
the crime), and the interest of the parents and relatives.3" The court in
Workman noted that the defendant was not able to show any prejudice
resulting from the closure order's excluding "unnecessary" persons. 32
The Workman court, however, did not resolve the precise issue of who
is unnecessary: the family of the defendant? one reporter representing
a "pool" of reporters? the relatives, guardian, or friend of the victim?
Many times the relatives of the victim may be actually hostile to the
victim, particularly where the defendant is a family member.33 Undoubtedly, such hostility could affect the composure of the child-vic-

27. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 608 (1982); State v. Workman, 14 Ohio App. 3d 385, 389, 471 N.E.2d 853, 859-60 (1984); WHITCOMB, supra note 1, at 46
("Anecdotal evidence suggests that the courtroom audience is not a major concern for many children. To be sure, some children will indeed be humiliated by public exposure of their
victimization.").
28. 14 Ohio App. 3d 385, 389, 471 N.E.2d 853, 859-60 (1984).
29. Id. The court in Workman adopted the standard for closure set forth in Globe, 457 U.S.
at 608.
30. Workman, 14 Ohio App. 3d at 389, 471 N.E.2d at 859-60.
31. Id.
32. Id.
S. SGROI,. supra
Published33.by See
eCommons,
1986 note I, at 93.
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tim. 3 ' The Workman court did not, however, address this potential
problem.
Although there is no Ohio case law indicating whether parents or
friends of the victims remaining in the courtroom while all others are
excluded is prejudicial per se to the defendant, other state court deci5
sions have touched upon the issue. In People v. Mountain, the trial
court allowed only family, police, media, and members of a rape crisis
organization to remain in the courtroom while the rape victim testified.
On appeal, the Mountain court ruled that there had been no denial of
defendant's right to public trial, but rather that the court's action was
a simple exercise of discretion to help and protect the witness and to
maintain order and decorum.3 6 In State v. Raymond,3 7 the appellate
court held that where the mother of a two-year-old child, who was sexually abused, testified against her husband, and where her adult children disrupted her testimony by making threats, the trial court's exclusion of defendant's step-children did not violate the husband's right to a
public trial.3 8 The appellate court determined that this action was simply an exercise of the trial court's power to keep order and to prevent
0
undue embarrassment to witnesses.3 9 Finally, in Rodriguez v. State,
the appellate court held that the trial court's exclusion of all spectators
except media personnel during the rape victim's testimony did not violate defendant's right to a public trial, when the victim requested exclusion because of her personal embarrassment."1 In none of these cases
did the court find that prejudice had resulted from the closure of the
courtroom.
Ideally, to keep the trial running in a smooth manner, any notice
of closure should be made either sua sponte by the court or by motion
of the defense prior to trial, so that a full discussion and complete record can be made without interrupting the trial in progress. Pretrial closure notice, thus made, will ensure that no unnecessary disruption of
the proceedings occurs.
IV.

COMPETENCY OF CHILD WITNESSES

An additional pertinent issue in child sex abuse cases is that of the
competency of the child-victim to testify. Ohio Evidence Rule 601(A)

34. id.
35. 105 A.D.2d 494, 481 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1984).
36. Id. at 496, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
37. 447 So. 2d 51 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
38. Id. at 53.
39. Id.
40. 424 So. 2d 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/3
41. See id. at 893.
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as to competency restates Ohio Revised Code section 2317.01 nearly
verbatim. Ohio Evidence Rule 601(A) states that: "Every person is
competent to be a witness except . . ..[t]hose of unsound mind, and
children under ten (10) years of age, who appear incapable of receiving
just impressions of the facts and transactions respecting which they are
examined, or of relating them truly ....
The customary basis for barring young children from testifying
has been their tendency to confuse fact and fantasy. 43 Although evidence is inconclusive, researchers believe that children are unable to
fabricate a detailed sexually explicit story of sexual abuse unless they
have actually experienced it. 4 4 While a child over ten years of age is
considered prima facie competent, 45 the age of the child at the time of
the occurrence and not the age at the time of trial is controlling as to
the child's ability to observe and recollect. 46 Ohio courts have interpreted this area of the law to require that a trial court must hold a
hearing on competency regardless of whether a hearing is requested by
counsel. 47 Nevertheless, counsel may participate in voir dire examination of youthful witnesses. 4" The court, however, should conduct the
examination of the witness beyond the presence of the jury.49 In determining the competency of the witness, a trial court should consider the
child's intellectual capacity for observation, recollection, and communication and the child's appreciation of the obligation to tell the truth.5 0
While the Supreme Court of Ohio has questioned the capacity of a
young victim to appreciate the meaning and significance of taking an
oath, 51 questions put to children asking them to articulate the definition

42. OHIo R. EvID. 601(A). According to the staff notes on 601(A), while this evidentiary
rule is ostensibly applicable to civil cases, it also applies to criminal cases. Therefore, while much
of the case law involves civil cases, the holdings would apply to criminal cases as well.
43. See WHITCOMB. supra note 1, at 36.
44. Id.
45. See State v. Carey, 107 Ohio App. 149, 157 N.E.2d 381 (1958).
46. See Huprich v. Paul W. Varga & Sons, 3 Ohio St. 2d 87, 209 N.E.2d 390 (1965).
47. See Berea v. Petcher, 119 Ohio App. 165, 188 N.E.2d 605 (1963).
48. See State v. Adams, No. 37379 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist. May 8, 1979).
49. See State v. Wilson, 156 Ohio St. 525, 533, 103 N.E.2d 552, 557 (1952); State v.
Bowling, No. S-84-29 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist. June 28, 1985) State v. Molen, No. C-830946
(Ohio Ct. App., IstDist. June 19, 1985); .
50. See Barnett v. State, 104 Ohio St. 298, 103 N.E. 647 (1922); State v. Floyd, No. 49737
(Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist. Aug. 22, 1985); State v. Meyers, No. 12018 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist.
July 24, 1985); In re Newsome, No. 9031 (Ohio Ct. App., 2d Dist. May 16, 1985); State v.
Bowling, No. S-84-29 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist. June 28, 1984); State v. Workman, 14 Ohio App.
3d 385, 471 N.E.2d 853 (1984).
51. See State v. Holt, 17 Ohio St. 2d 81, 83, 246 N.E.2d 365, 366 (1969) ("In the abstract,
there may be doubt as to whether the average seven-year-old child can appreciate the meaning
and significance of an oath, and whether such a child is capable of testifying on a given subject
accurately
and truthfully.").
Published
by eCommons,
1986
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of a lie and asking whether they appreciate the fact that they will get
in trouble with their parent or other authority figure if they do tell a
52
lie, appear to satisfy the second prong. One court has held it permissible to allow a young witness who, after being found competent, was
unable to recite or remember any of the facts upon direct or cross examination to be recalled, "re-voir dired," and again declared competent.5 3 Generally, the trial court's decision to allow the youthful witness
to testify will not be disturbed by the reviewing court unless it clearly
appears from the record that the court abused its discretion or misapplied the law.

54

Research indicates that children, regardless of age, will lie no
55
more or less than adults; in addition, "[s]ince adults are at least likely

to lie or to report incorrect facts during testimony, it seems only logical
that children be allowed to testify to the best of their ability, just as
adults do."' 56 The Attorney General Task Force on Family Violence
urges: "Children, regardless of their age, should be presumed to be
competent to testify in court. A child's testimony should be allowed
into evidence with credibility being determined by the jury.

' 57

As con-

cluded by one legal commentator:
The bottom line in the competency question appears to be the common sense axiom that people-including children-are different. From
this standpoint, age is a somewhat arbitrary discriminator of legal competency to testify in court. Adoption of the more liberal Federal and
Uniform Rules of Evidence, which allow children to testify and permit
of the testimony,
the trier of fact to determine the weight and credibility
58
children.
involving
cases
in
justice
facilitate
would
V.

LEADING QUESTIONS

Another area of concern in dealing with a youthful witness is the
use of leading questions. The allowance or refusal of leading questions
in the examination of a witness is a matter within the discretion of the
trial court.5 9 While Ohio Rules of Evidence, Rule 611(C) states that
See State v. Wright, No. 85AP-79 (Ohio Ct. App., 10th Dist. June 20, 1985).
See State v. York, No. C-830944, slip op. at I (Ohio Ct. App., 1st Dist. Oct. 10, 1984).
Holt, 17 Ohio St. 2d at 83, 246 N.E.2d at 366.
55.. See WHITCOMB, supra note 1, at 38.
56. Id. See also Goodman & Michelli, Would You Believe a Child Witness?, PSYCHOLOGY
52.
53.
54.

TODAY,

57.

Nov., 1981, at 82.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT

39 (1984).

At least 23 states have eliminated competency qualifications of children by statute or rule of
evidence changes.
58. WHITCOMB, supra note I, at 38.
59. See Evans v. State, 24 Ohio St. 458, 462 (1873), cited in Seley v. G.D. Searle Co., 67
Ohio St. 2d 192, 204, 423 N.E.2d 831, 840 (1981).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/3
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"[Il]eading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a
witness except as may be necessary to develop his testimony," 60 the
rule has not changed the discretionary rule of permitting leading questions. 1 Thus, Ohio courts have held that where the witness is of tender
years at the time of trial and testifies regarding an embarrassing or
delicate subject matter, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by
allowing the state to conduct leading questions on direct examination."'
VI.

USE OF ANATOMICALLY CORRECT

DOLLS

A further area of growing interest in the detection of sexual abuse
of children, and in the presentation of evidence at trial in such cases is
the use of anatomically correct dolls. In interviewing the child-victim
and in assuring an effective recount of the offense, social workers and
medical personnel have found anatomically correct dolls quite useful."'
A child may be reluctant, embarrassed, or unable to explain the sexual
activity with correct sexual terminology. 64 Prosecutors, as well as child
abuse teams, have found that anatomically correct dolls assist not only
in the pretrial investigation, but they also may help the child during
trial. Thus, anatomically correct dolls have been approved during trial
to assist young witnesses in illustrating their testimony. The Ohio
courts have held that where the child is unable to relate to the jury the
appropriate sexual or physiological terminology, the dolls may be used
to clarify the witness' explanation, thus assuring a common understanding between the child-victim and the jury. 6
Often objections arise where the child has been interviewed by a
social worker, physician, or other member of a child abuse team where
anatomically correct dolls have been used to elicit the child's history
for diagnosis and treatment. 66 Defense counsel's objections are likely to
be based upon the lack of an exception to hearsay for admitting the
60. OHIO R. EVID. 611(c).
61. See State v. Butterfield, No. C-840353 (Ohio Ct. App., IstDist. Mar. 13, 1985); State
v. Madden, 15 Ohio App. 3d 130, 472 N.E.2d 1126 (1984).
62. See Butterfield, No. C-840353, slip op. at 12; State v. Skaggs, No. 84AP-463, slip op.
at 4 (Ohio Ct. App., 10th Dist. July I I, 1985) (children are less skillful than adults in reproducing events using total recall). But see WHITCOMB, supra note I, at 35-37 (according to recent
experiments, children are not more susceptible to suggestions in leading questions than adults).
63. See S. SGROI, supra note 1,at 322.
64. Id.
65. See. e.g., Skaggs, No. 84AP-463, slip. op. at 2; State v. Madden, 15 Ohio App. 3d 130,
472 N.E.2d 1126 (1984); State v. Lee, 9 Ohio App. 3d 282, 459 N.E.2d 910 (1983). One Ohio
court has held that it can take judicial notice that children of seven (and presumably younger) do
not know the meaning of certain words with sexual connotations. In re Fairman, 3 Ohio N.P.
(n.s.) 485 (1905).
66. See, e.g., State v. Humfleet, No. CA84-04-31 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Sept. 9, 1985);
State by
v. Barnes,
No. CA84-05-041
(Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Apr. 8, 1985).
Published
eCommons,
1986
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out-of-court declaration. The objections to the use of anatomically correct dolls can involve two types of hearsay problems: (1) where the
child, in using a doll, makes nonverbal responses intended to be communicative declarations, and (2) where the child makes a verbal response with reference to a doll, for example, "this doll is me and this
doll is defendant and the defendant doll did this (gesturing or actually
describing the sexual event)." Where a child is interviewed to obtain a
history to be used by a rape-team physician for purposes of diagnosis
and treatment and where anatomically correct dolls are used, the nonverbal conduct with the dolls, while constituting hearsay, falls into the
exception to the prohibition against hearsay under Evidence Rule
803(4).67 Therefore, the nonverbal conduct is admissible at trial. There
is no requirement under Evidence Rule 803(4) that the statement or
nonverbal communication be made to a physician, as long as it was
made to a member of the child abuse team for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment.6 8
Nevertheless, courts which have admitted hearsay statements
describing particular occurrences in sex abuse cases under the medical
diagnosis or treatment exception, have not permitted statements as to
the identity of the defendant. 9 The Advisory Committee, in discussing
Federal Evidence Rule 803(4), has opined that statements as to fault
do not ordinarily qualify as an admissible exception to the hearsay
rule.7 0 Additionally, the courts have determined that the identity of the
defendant would be a statement of fault. 71 While the Staff Notes under
the Ohio Rules of Evidence indicate that Ohio Evidence Rule 803(4) is
identical to Federal Evidence Rule 803(4), the Staff Notes do not discuss whether statements of fault are admissible; however, one commentator, discussing Ohio law, has opined that statements of fault are still
inadmissible.7 2 One Ohio court, however, held that testimony from the
victim concerning the identity of the defendant was cumulative and,

67. Barnes, No. CA84-05-041, slip op. at 17. See United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77
(8th Cir. 1980) (interviewing for diagnostic purposes within exception to hearsay rule); United
States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979) (physician interviewing child within exception to
hearsay rule).
68. Barnes, No. CA84-05-041, slip op. at 32-33 (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note). Cf. In re Reeder v. Reeder, No. CA85-03-009 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Feb. 18,
1986) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (statements from a three-year-old to administrative head
of children services not within hearsay exception since her administrative skills were not sufficient
to qualify her as an "expert" in child sexual abuse).
69. See Iron Shell. 633 F.2d at 85; Nick, 604 F.2d at 1201-02.
70. FED. R. EvID. 803(4) advisory committee note.
71. See, e.g., Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 83-85.
72. P. GIANNELLI. OHIO EVIDENCE MANUAL art. VIII, author's comments 38 (1982), citing
Dorsten v. Lawrence, 20 Ohio App. 2d 297, 253 N.E.2d 804 (1969).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/3
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therefore, not prejudicial. 7 3 While that court did not specifically rule
that the testimony was admissible, it articulated its hesitation to rule
that the identity of the offender is never relevant.7 4 For example, in
sexual abuse cases involving children, the fact that the offender was a
family member or a person responsible for taking care of the victim
may be determinative for the accurate diagnosis of psychological
problems and for effecting appropriate treatment. 5
Several courts of other states, however, recently have rejected the
distinction between cause and fault and have allowed identification of
the perpetrator through the hearsay statement. In Goldade v. State,7 6
the Wyoming Supreme Court stated:
We have no quarrel with the general rule that statements attributing fault usually are not admissible under rules identical to Rule 803(4)
... . If the goal of our court were simply to pursue the common-law
tradition of stare decisis, then the cited authorities must be recognized as
supporting the position of the appellant. In this instance, however, the
function of the court must be to pursue the transcendent goal of addressing the most pernicious social ailment which afflicts our society, family
abuse, and more specifically, child abuse.77
The Goldade court further opined that declarations admitted
under the medical-treatment exception are generally considered reliable
and trustworthy because the declarant wishes to disclose to the physician all information necessary to improve his condition and because the
doctor relies upon these statements in deciding the course of treatment. 78 The court further reasoned that the identity of the person causing the injuries may be pertinent to the doctor's choice of treatment, if
not the diagnosis of injury. 79 There is more to treating a child abuse
victim, reasoned the court, than simply treating the present physical
damage. 80 Finally, the court noted that doctors or child abuse teams
must also decide whether the child may be in imminent danger and
determine the propriety of temporary protective custody. 8'
Without a doubt, the Goldade court's analysis of the treatment of
child abuse and its definition of medical treatment under the hearsay
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
to OHio
78.
79.
80.
81.
1982).

State v. Myers, No. 12018 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. July 24, 1985).
Id., slip op. at 4.
Id. See infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
674 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3539 (1984).
Id. at 725 (citations omitted).. It should be noted that Wvo. R. EVID. 803(4) is identical
R. EvID. 803(4).
Goldade, 674 P.2d at 726.
Id.
Id.
Id. See also United States v. Rhodes, !1 Fed. R. Serv. (Callaghan) 1520 (9th Cir.
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exception constitutes a more holistic approach than the traditional concept of mending cuts and patching bruises.8 2 As one student commentator has stated:
Courts have excluded statements attributing fault from admission
under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception because they may be
motivated by something other than the desire to aid medical diagnosis or
treatment. In child abuse cases, however, children's statements naming
an abuser are essentially a plea for help rather than an attribution of
blame. Children speak to physicians about abuse because they want help,
just as children with broken arms cry for help. Although young children
may not understand that the physician needs extensive and accurate information to treat them fully, children who are old enough to speak are
old enough to ask for help when they are hurting and in danger. Abused
children especially are likely to be motivated to tell the truth to physicians because the children must return to abusive parents and to further
danger. The children are motivated to tell the truth about their injuries,
including the identity of the abuser, for the same reason they will tell the
truth whenever they are sick or injured: to receive help. Therefore, because abused children's statements identifying an abuser are prompted
by the desire to aid medical diagnosis or treatment, they are sufficiently
reliable for admission under Rule 803(4).8 s

Another objection to hearsay statements made to a medical-abuse
team is that their admission may violate the sixth amendment right of
confrontation. The United States Supreme Court has set forth criteria
for determining the constitutionality of admissibility of hearsay evidence when the declarant is not available as a witness. In Ohio v. Roberts,84 the Court held that the proponent of the hearsay evidence must
make a good faith attempt to produce the witness at trial, and that the
hearsay evidence must bear an indicia of reliability to provide the trier
of fact with a basis to determine or evaluate the truth of the hearsay
statements.8 5 Where the witness is available, however, the out-of-court
verbal or nonverbal statements as testified to by another witness do not
violate the right of confrontation.86
Given that the statements of child-victims bear adequate indicia of

82. See Note, Evidence-Hearsay-Child Abuse and Neglect-A Child's Statements
Naming an Abuser Are Admissible Under the Medical Diagnosis or Treatment Exceptions to the
Hearsay Rule, 53 U. CINN. L. REv. 1155, 1171-72 (1984).
83. Id. at 1169 (footnotes omitted). See also Mentschikoff & Stotzky, Law-The Last of
the Universal Disciplines, 54 U. CINN. L. REV. 695, 700 (1986) ("A holistic approach to analyzing problems as they arise in the world is a prerequisite to the training of an artist in the law.").
84. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
85. Id. at 72-73.
86. See State v. Perryman, 49 Ohio St. 2d 14, 358 N.E.2d 634 (1976). See also OHIo R.
EvID. 801 (prior consistent statement exception to hearsay rule).
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reliability, the question remains does a child-victim become "unavailable" by being declared incompetent to testify? The answer has generally been yes with little dissent.87 Moreover, the United States Supreme
Court has backed away from Roberts by holding in United States v.
Inadi88 that "Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical
proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the
government without a showing that the declarant is unavailable." 89
VII.

EXPERT WITNESS OPINION

The issues surrounding the admission of expert witnesses' opinions
have also posed problems for courts in sexual child abuse cases. The
courts have permitted physicians on the child abuse team to testify as
to the cause of the injuries to a child-victim based upon their experience, training, and examination of the child. 90 Further, hypothetical
questions to a physician which elicit the response that the problems
experienced by the child-victim "could be" consistent with sexual child
abuse have been held to be admissible. 1 One Ohio court has also held
that where the defense makes an issue of the victim's delay in reporting
the alleged sexual offense, the state may call a psychologist who had
counseled the victim to explain that the victim was suffering from
"rape trauma syndrome"-a personality trait which is characterized
by
avoidance of discussing unpleasantries with authority figures concern-

87. It is interesting to note that two Ohio courts have discussed this situation, where an outof-court statement was made by a child who was deemed to be incompetent to testify at trial. See
State v. Humfleet, No. CA84-04-031 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Sept. 9, 1985); State v. Madden,
15 Ohio App. 3d 130, 472 N.E.2d 1126 (1984). In Humfleet, No. CA84-04-031 the court, while
raising the issue, found that no testimony was actually elicited in which actual statements of the
incompetent witness were repeated in court. Humfleet, slip. op. at 8-9. While considering the
federal rule, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th
Cir. 1979), apparently allowed the hearsay statement of an incompetent witness without too much
discussion concerning the issue of incompetence. The issue, however, has been discussed indirectly
by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Wilson, 156 Ohio St. 525, 103 N.E.2d 552 (1952), where
the court held that the deposition of a child under ten years of age could not be admitted into
evidence without determination of the child's competency at the taking of the deposition. Id. at
528, 103 N.E. 2d at 555. See also Lancaster v. People, 200 Colo. 448, 615 P.2d 720 (1980)
(sufficient indicia of reliability to allow out-of-court statement by child judged incompetent to
testify); State v. Gorman, 229 Minn. 524, 40 N.W.2d 347 (1949) (incompetent child's out-ofcourt statement if reliable is admissible). According to some, child victims' hearsay reports are
often more reliable than courtroom testimony. Burkley, Child Sexual Abuse and the Law National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection, AMERICAN BAR Assoc. 189
(4th ed. 1983).
88. 106 S. Ct. 1121 (interim ed. 1986).
89. Id. at 1126.
90. See State v. Canada, No. C-840189 (Ohio Ct. App., 1st Dist. Apr. 17, 1985).
91. See State v. Humfleet, No. CA84-04-031 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Sept. 9, 1985). In
State v.Barnes, No. CA84-05-041 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Apr. 8, 1985), the court held that
the by
post-trauma
act of 1986
the victim soiling his pants was consistent with his testimony of anal rape.
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ing sexual events.9 2 Additionally, some Ohio courts have held that the
opinion of a social worker on the child abuse team has been permitted
under Evidence Rule 702 as to whether or not the child involved has
been a victim of sexual abuse. 93 However, at least one court has held
sexu- •
that a social worker's opinion as to whether or not the child was
94
Rule 702.
ally abused was outside the perimeter of Evidence
95 the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Twelfth
In State v. Harris,
District held that while a social worker, based upon her experience and
training, was indeed an expert witness, the social worker's opinion that
the child had been sexually abused because the child's story was clear,
unprompted, and sounded like a story that a ten-year-old would tell,
was a substitution of her opinion as to the credibility of the child-victim.96 The court determined that this did not assist the trier of fact to
97
understand the evidence or determine the facts and issues. As pointed
out by Professor John Palmer in his review of Harris:
Admittedly this is a close question, however what is wrong with expert testimony as to the credibility of minor children who have allegedly
suffered the trauma of being abused sexually?
It is not uncommon for doctors and social workers to indicate that young
children are not able to give detailed sexual information concerning
abuse. Why not permit the other shoe to drop. This is certainly one criterion to determine whether or not abuse has taken place. If a police officer
can testify as to the point of impact in an automobile accident case, why
should the jury not be assisted by an expert in evaluating the credibility
of a child of tender years in an abuse case.
Of course, such testimony should not be permitted until the credibility of
the child has been attacked by the defense, but why not permit such
testimony? The court held that the credibility of the child was a pivotal
issue for purposes of determining the defendants guilt or innocence,
found the error to be prejudice and reversed. If the credibility of the
child was so pivotal, wouldn't the evaluation of the expert have aided and
assisted the jury? 9"
Young children are unable to describe explicit sexual details unless
92. See State v. Ziruolo, No. 11960 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. June 26, 1985).
93. See State v. Jackson, No. C-830331, (Ohio Ct. App., Ist Dist. Apr. 11, 1984).
94. State v. Harris, No. CA84-10-073 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. June 17, 1985). See also
In re Reeder v. Reeder, No. CA85-03-009 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Feb. 18, 1986) (LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file) ("Our decision today should not be construed as setting any hard and
fast guidelines for determining when a social worker is qualified to testify as an expert in the
area.").
95. No. CA84-10-073 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. June 17, 1985).
96. Id., slip op. at 4.
97. Id.
98. J. PALMER, OHIo RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 831 (1984).
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they have obtained this information through observation of others or
through participation in sexual activities. 9 As indicated by Professor
Palmer, this is an important consideration for a social worker in determining whether sexual abuse has occurred. While admittedly this consideration may border on the determination of credibility of the child
witness, nevertheless the expert's opinion, based upon relevant criteria
which the expert utilizes in his professional assessments of whether or
not abuse has occurred, should be admissible as an aide for the jury's
consideration.
VIII. ELEMENT EVIDENCE PROBLEMS
There are some common issues which arise concerning elements
which must be met in sexual child abuse cases. In a charge of rape
under title 29, section 2907.02(A)(3) of the Ohio Revised Code, the
state, in an effort to enhance the penalty, may also allege a specification that the offender purposely compelled the victim to submit by
force or threat of force. 100 Where the victim is under thirteen years of
age, the success or failure to prove force or threat of force means the
difference between a sentence of four to twenty-five years (without
force) and life imprisonment (with force). 10 1 The penalty of life imprisonment for child rape with force has been held not to violate the excessive sentencing or the cruel and unusual punishment under the Ohio
and United States Constitutions.1 02 Invariably, defense counsel will
move at the end of the state's case or at the conclusion of the trial for a
motion to dismiss the specification in an effort to remove the penalty
enhancement.
Force has been defined under Ohio Revised Code section 2901.01
(A) as: "any violence, compulsion or constraint physically exerted by
any means upon or against a person or thing." 0 3 Under Ohio Revised
Code section 2905.12(E), threat includes direct threat and threat by
innuendo or indirect remark. 0'o Often in these cases the sexual conduct
occurs between the child and a family member or known adult who is
"in a legitimate power position over a child and who exploits accepted
societal patterns of dominance and authority to engage the child in sexual activity."' 0° Seldom is force, as adults normally define force, used
99. See S. SGROI, supra note I, at 43.
100. OHIO REV. CODE § 2907.02(A)(3) (Anderson 1982 & Supp. 1986).
101. Id. §§ 2907.02(A)(3), 2929.11 (B)(1).
102. See State v. Barnes, No. CA84-05-041, slip op. at 23-25 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist.
Apr. 8, 1985).
103. OHIO REV. CODE § 2901.01(A) (Anderson 1982 & Supp. 1986).
104. OHIO REV. CODE § 2905.12(E) (Anderson 1982); JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMMITTEE OF
THE OHIO JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, 4 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 507.02(10) (1985).
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in a child rape-"[tlhe successful perpetrator will manage to be coercive in a subtle fashion." 1 6 The degree of force required to compel an
eight or twelve-year-old child to perform or refrain from performing an
act is necessarily less than the amount of force required to compel an
07
adult to perform or refrain from performing a similar act.' Thus, one
court has held that the act of taping shut the mouth of a child and the
superior size of the perpetrator, coupled with the fact that the act occurs in the presence of and with the approval of the parents and on
more than one occasion, have a cumulative10 8effect of forcing the victim
to submit to further acts of sexual abuse.
Further, the threat of force may be implied from surrounding cir0
cumstances.0 9 In State v. Hartsook," the court construed the accused's superior size and strength, the demanding tone of voice, and the
nature of his statements as constituting a threat of force."' The court
held that it was not necessary for the accused to use language which
12
The court further held that the
directly threatened physical harm.
is sufficient from the point of
comments
or
actions
context of certain
the threat of force critesatisfy
to
view of both the offender and victim
ria.1" In State v. Barnes,"" the court found that where the victims
were subjected to a continuing course of sexual abuse by four family
members, including the mother who looked on as the victims' mouths
were taped shut and family members threatened to kill them if they
revealed the activities to others,'" the children were reasonably permitted to infer that "these threats and exhibitions of force applied to sexual conduct with their mother . . .,"'6 sufficient to meet the criteria
for force or threat of force when the mother without comment would
perform involuntary fellatio with her nine, seven, and two-year-old
sons.
In a case of rape involving a thirteen-year-old child and anal intercourse, one court has held that insertion of the penis between the buttocks without actual penetration into the anus is sufficient to meet the

106. Id.
107. See State v. Wilson, No. C-840903, slip op. at 5 (Ohio Ct. App., 1st Dist. Oct. 9,
1985).
108. See State v. Humfleet, No. CA84-04-031 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Sept. 9, 1985).
109. See State v. Davis, 6 Ohio St. 3d 91, 451 N.E.2d 241; Barnes, slip op. at 20; State v.
Hartsook, No. CA84-02-009 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Dec. 28, 1984).
110. No. CA84-02-009 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Dec. 28, 1984).
Ill. Id., slip op. at 5.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. No. CA84-05-041 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Apr. 8, 1985).
115. Id., slip op. at 8.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/3
116. Id., slip op. at 9.
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requirements of penetration." 7 Further, one court has also held that
the definition of fellatio under Revised Code Section 2907.02(A)(3) is
not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, and that oral genital "kissing," not constituting actual penetration, establishes the element of fellatio.11 8 Thus penetration of the mouth is not required to prove fellatio." 9 Additionally, where sexual conduct is an issue by virtue of a
charge of rape (fellatio), there is no statutory requirement that sexual
arousal or gratification be proved by the state as an element. 20
One of the elements necessary in most sexual offenses is that the
victim is not the spouse of the defendant at the time of the commission
of the offense. Ohio courts have held that where a victim's marital status to the defendant is not addressed, the jury may conclude that the
victim is not the spouse of the defendant by circumstantial evidence."
IX.

CONCLUSION

The many issues pertaining to evidence and testimony in sexual
child abuse cases are being addressed more and more by the courts
throughout the State of Ohio with significant agreement on the issues.
If this article has achieved its author's purpose, it will have demonstrated to the reader that certain evidentiary problems still exist, however, and require further review, discussion, and possible reform. In
particular, the need for a specific time in the indictment where a defendant has filed specific alibi notification should be expressly addressed by the courts or legislation. Additionally the need for a complete review of the presumption of incompetency of children under ten
years of age ought to be examined by the courts and legislature. The
courts should also more specifically define unnecessary parties in closure cases. The courts, through their rule-making power, need to
amend Evidence Rule 803(4) to allow identification of the perpetrator
or statement of fault in the manner discussed above. The courts must
also settle the issues surrounding expert opinions and child abuse team
members' testimony in child abuse cases. While changes are needed,
nevertheless, the courts and legislature in their zeal to make these nec117. See State v. Allen, No. C-840479 (Ohio Ct. App., 1st Dist. May 8, 1985).
118. See Barnes, No. CA84-05-041, slip op. at 6-7.
119. State v. Hiltabidel, No. 11971, slip op. at 3-4 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. May 1, 1985);
State v. Goins, No. C-800261, slip op. at 8 (Ohio Ct. App., 1st Dist. Apr. 15, 1981).
120. See State v. Canada, No. C84-01-89, slip op. at 4 (Ohio Ct. App., 1st Dist. Apr. 17,
1985).
121. State v. Moore, No. CA85-09-068 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Mar. 24, 1986); State v.
Bock, No. C-850124 (Ohio Ct. App., Ist Dist. Feb. 5, 1986) (failure to give instruction on "not
the spouse of the offender is harmless where 12-year-old boy could not be spouse of adult male
defendant" under any conceivable interpretation of the evidence); State v. Rafferty, No. CA8506-022
Ct. App., 1986
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essary reforms must be careful not to trample upon the rights of the
accused. Further, overzealous reform may lead to appellate reversal or
even eventual legislative backlash or inaction reversing the apparent reforms already made.
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